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Dry Rivers, Scary Strangers: Are Financial And
Cyber Crises Alike?1
Claudia Biancotti2 and Paolo Ciocca3

Abstract: The internet and the financial system show crucial affinities: both are tightly
interconnected global networks whose orderly functioning is a prerequisite for economic prosperity.
In financial and cyber crises alike, vulnerabilities are a consequence of distorted economic incentives,
contagion is fast, and the most serious risk is loss of trust. Lessons learned from financial meltdowns
translate to the cybersecurity world: stability cannot be achieved until policies are in place to address
all of these issues. Steps have been taken to rectify incentives, as exemplified by recent European
Union legislation. Data that helps identify weak nodes are still scarce, notwithstanding recent efforts.
The preservation of trust is the hardest challenge: in the financial system, a global governance
framework was put in place to help maintain and rebuild confidence at critical junctions, but
conflicting national interests make it difficult to establish a cyber equivalent.
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Advanced economies are immersed in cyberspace. In 2016, 95 percent of businesses in OECD
countries had a broadband internet connection; 77 percent had a web presence. More than half of the
adult population had purchased a product or service online, compared to 36 per cent in 20104.
As digitalization progresses, a growing share of production and consumption activities depend
on connectivity. From an economist’s point of view, there are evident analogies between the internet
and the global financial system: both are tightly interconnected networks that provide lifeblood to the
real economy, via transfers of information and funding, respectively.
Indeed, a financial crisis and a cyber crisis look alike in three key dimensions:
(i)

vulnerabilities accumulate because of excessive risk-taking on the part of some agents,
which eventually translates to systemic risk on account of interdependencies;

(ii)

disruption can start at a single weak point and spread to the whole system in a matter of
days or even hours;

(iii)

the ultimate casualty is trust: once it is lost, transactions – and the whole economy – can
grind to a halt as counterparties disconnect from each other.
Policy responses can be deployed to address these problems so that crises can be prevented or

at least managed effectively. In the financial system, safeguards have been established over time:
examples are strict capital requirements for lenders, orderly resolution procedures for failing
institutions, and collection of micro-level data aimed at identification of individual weak nodes5. They
are not all-encompassing, but they do help reduce the risk.
Where cyberspace is concerned, this process is still in its infancy. Some results have been
achieved with respect to (i) above. A small but insightful literature on the economics of cybersecurity6
points out that distorted economic incentives, rather than technically sophisticated attacks, are at the
heart of the problem.
Software is born vulnerable because of network externalities. For products such as operating
systems and messaging platforms, the value increases with the size of the installed base; developers
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forego security as they scramble to get to the market first, attract a critical mass of users, and shut
competition off. The absence of developer liability for buggy software does not help.
The market for cyber defense is plagued by information asymmetries. Vendors know more
than their customers: they may have an opportunity to push whatever solution maximizes their own
profit, independent of how effective it is. Finally, the cost of cyber attacks in many cases is not fully
internalized by the immediate victims: for example, the owner of a vulnerable IoT device that gets
recruited into a botnet typically has no statutory liability (yet) for damage caused by the botnet.
Some corrective measures have already been introduced, while others are being drafted. In
the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – coming into force in May
2018 – imposes steep fines to businesses that put the confidentiality of personal data at risk and
mandates disclosure of breaches to both authorities and data subjects. The Directive on Security of
Networks and Information Systems (NIS), also coming into force this year, introduces cyber
protection requirements and incident disclosure obligations for key players in sectors such as energy,
finance, and healthcare. A regulation proposal put forth by the European Commission envisages an
EU-wide framework for security certification of hardware and software, fashioned after the
notoriously strict CE scheme for safety, health and environmental protection.
These are necessary steps, but they are not enough; the effects of GDPR and NIS are confined
to certain cases or sectors. More theoretical work is needed to define broader principles: generalized
liability for damage caused to third parties may be a good idea, yet an ordinary citizen whose email
account gets spoofed by phishers should probably not be forced to compensate victims.
With respect to (ii), there is still a significant knowledge gap about the location and
interconnections of weak nodes. As pointed out by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors in 2017, “reliable, impartial, comprehensive and widely accessible”7 data on the frequency
and economic impact of cyber attacks are still rare. The same goes for information on network and
economic connections, e.g. through digital and physical supply chains.
Evidence from the Bank of Italy’s business surveys suggests that cyber risk may be
concentrated among high-tech, non-ICT businesses8, which are more exposed and interesting to
attackers compared to low-tech ones, and less proficient at defense than the ICT sector. The data also
suggest that mass adoption of relatively simple internet-based solutions, such as e-commerce
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platforms, cloud computing services or IoT devices is a stronger risk factor than the selective adoption
of advanced technologies, like machine learning or industrial robotics. These indications are vital in
understanding which sectors of the economy need urgent intervention, be it in terms of awareness
campaigns, dedicated incentives, or regulation.
The problem sub (iii) is the hardest to solve. After the 2009 financial meltdown, trust was
only restored after a series of large-scale, highly controversial injections of public money in the
banking system, and substantial reinforcement of a global governance framework which encompasses
broad-based organizations such as the Financial Stability Board, the Bank for International
Settlements and the International Monetary Fund, regional institutions such as the European System
of Financial Supervision, and national authorities.
In a cyber crisis, there is no immediately evident equivalent of a public-sector backstop.
Perhaps more importantly, a global governance framework is very hard to build because in cyberspace
a crisis is generally triggered by an intentional act of aggression; an adversary is in the picture and
may serve, directly or indirectly, the interests of a nation-state.
In this sense, the right comparison might be with currency or trade wars; the problem is mostly
one of political, diplomatic and military relations, especially in a world where the weight of
authoritarian governments increases. This is where input from economics is not sufficient and must
be complemented by scholarship in the various facets of international relations.
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